Youssef

redaction-ci

GitHub Action that fails CI when a committed PDF still contains the text it pretends to have redacted. gitleaks, but for PDFs.

Code on GitHub

Language
Python
Licence
MIT
Last push
12 Nov 2026
redaction-ci: GitHub Action that fails CI when a committed PDF still contains the text it pretends to have redacted. gitleaks, but for PDFs.

What it is

gitleaks, but for PDFs. A GitHub Action that fails the build the moment a committed PDF still contains the text it pretends to have redacted.

Drawing a black rectangle over a paragraph does not remove the paragraph. The text stays in the PDF content stream, one copy-paste away for anyone who opens the file. Redaction-CI catches that before it reaches your repository, plus every other classic way a “redacted” PDF leaks: unapplied redaction annotations, invisible or camouflaged text layers, text dragged off the page, screenshots pasted over live text, filled form fields, embedded attachments, and earlier revisions left behind by incremental saves. Built for repositories that hold contracts, invoices, legal filings and incident reports as PDFs.

How it works

  • Paint order matters. A box only “hides” text if it is drawn after the text in the content stream (seqno comparison). Dark panels with light text on top (a common, legitimate design) are not flagged, and a covered run that is visibly redrawn on top of the panel is suppressed as a benign generator quirk. Only a copy painted on top of the box counts as “visible”; a decoy drawn under it does not.
  • The box must be redaction-like. Filled path, fill opacity ≥ min-fill-opacity (default 0.5), perceived luminance ≤ max-fill-luma (default 0.85). White-outs are not flagged by default; raise max-fill-luma to 1.0 to include them.
  • Overlap threshold. A box must cover at least min-overlap (default 0.5) of a text run’s bounding box to count as hiding it.
  • Fail-closed. Encrypted PDFs, unparseable files, an explicitly empty or negation-only paths input, an explicit glob that matches nothing, and excludes that remove every matched file all fail the step (exit 2): an unverifiable or empty scan is not a clean scan. Repos with no PDFs at all pass.

The detector uses the same primitives an attacker would (text extraction, drawing geometry, revision recovery), so what it flags is what standard text extractors can recover.

Results

File Page Type Severity Recoverable text
contracts/merger-agreement.pdf 1 covered-text confirmed Internal key: DO-NOT-SHARE-9911
contracts/nda-draft.pdf 1 unapplied-redaction confirmed Internal key: DO-NOT-SHARE-9911
press-release.pdf 1 invisible-text warning Hidden copy: TOPSECRET-4455

Try it

python3.12 -m venv .venv && .venv/bin/pip install -r requirements.txt pytest ruff
.venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/ -q          # unit + fixture tests
.venv/bin/python tests/make_fixtures.py       # regenerate fixtures/*.pdf
.venv/bin/ruff check .                        # lint